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4
6,7,9

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK

In accordance with Rule 75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, wherein new matter raised in respondent's brief may be
answered, Appellant replies with argument as follows:
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF SUSTAINS APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF AN INSUFFICIENT
AFFIDAVIT TO PUBLISH SUMMONS, BY ADMITTING TO CERTAIN FALSITY THEREIN.
The footnote on page 5 of Appellant's brief refers to circumstances that have been frustrating to Appellant thus far, in that
certain representations contained in Respondent's affidavit (R 29,
paragraphs 6 & 8) although discovered to be false at the last moment
in the court below such issues have not been officially before this
Honorable Court until now.
That is, the affidavit (R 28, 29) upon which an order to publish
the summons (R 27) was based, states:
"Affiant has also been advised by said William Richards,
(that Richards) had numerous contacts with Robert
W. Major and Joseph L. Krofcheck, that neither of such
persons resides in the State of Utah, and that Joseph L.
Krofcheck was believed to be then residing at 16363 Royal
Hills Drive, Encino, California 91316
" (Brackets
added)
Paragraph 6., Respondent's Affidavit (R 28, 29)
As hereinbefore indicated, attorney William Richards has denied
the foregoing statements attributed to him by Respondent's Affidavit
(R 28, 29) in a sworn affidavit of his own (Appellant's brief, footnote, page 5 ) .
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However, the Respondent has now also implicitly admitted the
falsity of the aforesaid quoted recitals appearing in the said Affidavit (R 28, 2 9 ) , by virtue of these statements from their brief on
appeal herein:
"Mr. Melling was told by Richards' staff that his office
had had numerous occasions to contact Major and Krofcheck
by mail and the most recent addresses contained in the
Richards' files for both men were noted. Melling attempted
to have legal process served upon Krofcheck at the address
given him by Richards' staff (16363 Royal Hills Drive,
Encino, California)..." (T-mphasis added)
Brief of Respondent, Statement of Facts, page 9, second
paragraph.
Thus, the facts which are admitted to in Respondent's brief
(page 9, supra) are not those sworn to by Mr. George D. Melling in his
affidavit (R 28, 29); and, since extensive conversations and correspondence as well as a formal hearing in this Honorable Supreme Court
specifically embraced the aforesaid conflicting statements prior to
the filing of Respondent's brief, it is reasonable to assume that
yery

careful consideration was given to the language which Mr. Melling

employed in his said current Brief of Respondent (page 9, supra.)
Therefore, on the face of the record and pleadings now properly
before this court on appeal we are able to verify that Mr. Melling's
affidavit (R 28, 29) is indeed a false affidavit.

Moreover, had said

affidavit set forth the true nature of Mr. Melling's "diligent search",
as admitted to in his subject brief, it is unlikely that Judge Harding,
or any Judge, would have issued an order for the publication of summons
as was rendered in this matter (R 27). Specifically, what person on
"Richards' staff" "told" Mr. Melling about the "contact" with Appellant,
and "noted" information from the "Richards' file", and provided "the
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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address" for Appellant (3-1/2 year old incorrect address), as finally
admitted to herein (Respondent's brief, page 9, supra)?

We know that

attorney William Richards did not represent those matters, as originally
sworn to by Mr. Melling in his affidavit (R 29, par. 6 & 8 ) . However,
even if said affidavit had conformed to the facts now admitted to in
Respondent's brief (page 9, supra), and the "staff" member was disclosed
by name (which has not been done even yet) it is doubtful that such a law
firm secretary, receptionist, filing clerk, legal messenger or possibly
janitor (constituting the "staff"),

could be considered a single

competent source for ascertaining Appellant's whereabouts, particularly
since attorney Richards and his law firm have never

been Appellant's

legal counsel!
The legal authority cited by Respondent in defense of the purported
"sufficiency of the Melling affidavit" (Respondent's brief, page 18, (2))
instead will support Appellant's position under the foregoing
circumstances:
"In Liebhart (Liebhart v Lawrence (Utah) 120 p. 215) this
court held that the affidavit was willfully false and that
the resulting publication of summons was invalid. And in
Bowen, (Bowen v. Olson, (Utah) 246 P.2d 602) this court
held that the affidavit which had been prepared on a printed
form was apparently fraudulent and that the service of the
summons by publication was invalid."
Brief of Respondent, pages 18, 19.
Appellant's brief herein, pages 13 to 17, encompasses his position
regarding the insufficiency of the Melling affidavit (R 29,) on grounds
other than the falsity charge described above in this reply brief.
However, the grounds in both briefs, whether taken together or considered independently, compel the conclusion that the said affidavit
(R 29) is certainly insufficient to warrant an order for publication
of summons (R 27).
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FURTHER SUPPORTS THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
MELLING AFFIDAVIT BY ADMITTING TO SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANOTHER
SOURCE FOR APPELLANT'S ADDRESS, WHICH WAS NOT USED.
Respondent erroneously represents to this court that Utah Code
Annotated Sect. 57-3-2 (1953) merely states that Respondent would only
be charged with notice of prior documents recorded affecting "that
same real property" (Respondent's brief, pp. 21,22) covered by their
mortgages.

Reference to said statute reveals no such limitation.

Moreover, Replacement Volume 6A, Utah Code Annotated, embraces the
"general and permanent laws of the state in force at the close of
the fortieth legislature ... 1973" (UCA, Vol. 6A, title page).

Thus,

this Utah case would govern the interpretation of said Sect. 57-3-2
through 1973, having been cited thereunder in said Replacement Volume
6A, to wit:
"One who deals with real property is charged with notice
of what is shown by the records of the county recorder
°f the county in which the real property is situated."
TEmphasis addedj
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 U. 55, 1 P.2d 242
Were Respondent's view of the aforesaid statute accurate the past
and current practice of federal and state tax authorities, judgment
creditors and general lienholders in recording their notices against
named individuals without describing specific property, would be
unavailing.

Such is not the case, however, and county recorder's

records are indexed for speedily cross checking names and realty covering extended periods of time, for all documents filed in the respective
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah counties.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and the fact there were multiple
records readily available disclosing Appellant's current address
(Appellant's brief, pages 4, 5, and 16), Respondent has attached a
Warranty Deed copy, identified as "Appendix G", to their brief herein.
They admit this instrument does in fact affect "that same real property"
embraced by their mortgages, (Respondents brief, page 22) and that they
knew of this vesting prior to the Melling affidavit (Respondent's
brief, page 9 ) . In the upper left hand corner of said deed appears
the name:

"M. ALAN BUNNAGE, Suite 220, 9220 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles,

California, 90069", which party was legal counsel for Appellant.

Re-

spondent has never claimed said attorney for Appellant was ever contacted in any way and the George Melling affidavit (R. 28, 29) nowhere
indicates this probable source for Appellant's address was even considered in Respondent's "diligent search" for Appellant's whereabouts.
Since Appellant was the grantee under said deed,( Respondent's
"Appendix G " ) , physical possession of that instrument would customarily
be directed into the custody and/or control of said Appellant-Grantee;
and, a fortiori, the party named to receive by mail said deed "when
recorded" (Respondent's "Appendix G.", upper-left) would be a logical
source leading to Appellant and would at least put a reasonable person
on notice to make inquiry of said "M. Alan Bunnage" (Respondent's
"Appendix G.", upper left), particularly when that same deed contained
the designation "trustee" for Appellant indicating others were involved
in said conveyance.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, we have this evidence of Respondent's actual knowledge
of at least one other likely source for Appellant's correct address
who could have been easily contacted yet Respondent was satisfied to
rest their "diligent search" on a single inquiry of "Richards' staff"
(Respondent's brief page 9), and thereafter have their summons and
complaint mailed by the Clerk to an address they knew beforehand was
erroneous (R. 29, par. 8; R 30; R 42).
POINT III
RESPONDENT'S LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT
RESPONDENT'S PUBLISHED SUMMONS WAS INSUFFICIENT.
Respondent's brief, pages 26 to 30, engages in argument attempting to show that this statement, from Respondent's published summons,
complied with Rule 4 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"This is an action to foreclose two mortgages on real
property located in Summit County, Utah." (R 45)
Summit County Bee Newspaper, Dec. 20, 27, 1973; Jan.
3, 10, 1974.
The first in line of legal authorities cited by Respondent seeking
to validate the sufficiency of the foregoing "description" of the real
property involved herein should be perfunctorily dismissed, since even
the portion of the decision quoted from Flanery v. Kuska, 173 NW 652,
a 1919 Minnesota case, states:

"The statute does not prescribe the

form of a summons" (Respondent's brief, page 27), indicating the
Minnesota statute did not conform to the requirements of Utah's Rule
4 (c).
Respondent's rely on "the test set out in Flanery", (Respondent's
brief, supra.), dealing in very general terms with the question of
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the notice intended to be given by a summons generally.

However,

"Flanery" is not the test for published summons as shown by:
"It is an established principle that in order to give a
court jurisdiction through publication the statutory
procedure must be followed, and the courts are disposed
to require strict compliance with the statutes."
(Emphasis added)
62 Am. Jur. 2d 896, Sect. Ill
As to the legal meaning of the term "strict" we refer to:
"A narrow construction of a statute...plain, obvious or
natural import of the language used."
50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sect. 388
Next in the line of Respondent's authorities are two Washington
State cases, Decorvet v. Dolan (1893) 35 P. 72, and Chase v. Carney
(1939) 90 P. 2d 286, which also must be routinely dismissed since admittedly the publication of summons statute governing said cases "does
not specifically require any such description" (Respondent's brief,
page 28), again indicating inapplicability to the instant cause before
this court which is governed by a Utah statute that does require a
"description of the subject matter or res involved in the action"
(Rule 4 (c), supra.)
Respondent's next authority must be examined more closely inasmuch as Respondent has failed to encompass the primary essentials of
this case, Caldwell v. Bigger, 76 Kan. 49, 90 P. 1095 (Respondent's
brief, page 28) which if they had would have destroyed their entire
argument that opposes Appellant's position on the subject.

Thus,

Appellant can summarize the facts in this case to clearly show that
a detailed legal description for real property is contemplated under

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a Kansas publication of summons statute, as set forth in said case's
decision:
"(1) Process-Service by Publication - Description of
Property.
In an action to quiet title, a notice by publication,
which describes the real estate by the lot & block
numbers of an addition to a city according to the
recorded plat thereof, which plat designates the land
by its proper government subdivision, which has in fact
been of record for a number of years, which has been
recognized by the city and public generally, and which
has been acted upon by the authorities for purposes of
taxation, sufficiently identifies the property affected
to give the court jurisdiction as against a defendant..."
(Emphasis added)
Caldwell v. Bigger, 90 P. 1095, (Supra.)
"The certificate to the plat specifically stated that it
embraced the NE 1/4 of Section 12, T23 S, R 6 W, of 6th
Principal Meridian...Service was made by publication...
and the notice was regular in e\/ery respect except that
the land was described as lots in blocks of the Hutchinson
Inv. Company's 9th Addition to the City of Hutchinson according to the recorded plat thereof."
Caldwell v. Bigger, at page 1096 (Supra.)
By contrast, Respondent's statement in their published summons
was limited to: "real property located in Summit County, Utah"
(Respondent's brief, "Appendix E " ) , which certainly fails the conclusion and test contained in Respondent's own cited authority
(Respondent's brief, page 28), to wit:
"The statutory requirement is satisfied if, from the
notice published, any person of common understanding
would be able to locate and identify the property."
Caldwell v. Bigger, (Supra)
The final case cited by Respondent's brief, page 29 thereof,
presumably as relevant authority on the sufficiency of their "description" of the real property involved under said Rule 4 (c), U.R.C.P.,
is identified as Francis v. Allen, 79 N.E. 2c[ 803 (Ohio 1947).

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There are vital distinctions between Respondent's Francis
and Appellant's cause herein.

case

Foremost among these is the basic Ohio

statute concerning the requirements for publication of summons as disclosed by the decision:
"Section 11295 of the General Code provides that the
notice (for publication of summons) ... must contain
a summary statement of the object and prayer of the
petition, mention the court wherein it is filed, and
notify the person or persons thus to be served when
they are required to answer."
Francis v. Allen, (Supra.)
Thus, said statute does not require a description of the res involved as does Rule 4 (c) U.R.C.P.
Ohio statutory procedure proceeds to further separate itself from
Utah by requiring that claimants to real property, whether by mortgage
foreclosure or otherwise, first sequester such property by attachment,
etc., before serving a non-resident defendant with summons by publication, as indicated from Respondent's aforesaid Francis authority:
"Where personal service cannot be had on a non-resident
defendant and action seeks to establish a claim or demand against such defendant, before court can acquire
jurisdiction (over defendant's property), a seizure of
property of such non-resident defendant is required as
a basis for constructive service. Gen. Code 11292,
subdv. 7, and Sect. 11819, subdv. 2" (Emphasis added)
Francis v. Allen (Supra)
However, where a plaintiff, such as Respondent, wishes to obtain
jurisdiction in rem over the real property of a non-resident defendant,
such as Appellant, through the publication of summons without first
sequestering the same pursuant to the foregoing Ohio statute, the said
Francis case cites the following authority for doing so, but on the
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basis of a detailed description for the land as proposed by Appellant
which is contrary to Respondent's view thereof, to wit:
"Where a petition asks to have specific land appropriated. . .and the publication notice contains a^ particular description of the land sought to be appropriated. ..this constitutes a sequestration of the
property and gives the court jurisdiction to dispose
thereof upon final decree."
Reed v. Reed, 167 NE 684 (Ohio; cited in Francis v.
Allen, supra)
The most charitable view of Respondent's analysis of said Francis
v. Allen (supra) case would be that such evaluation as contained in
their brief at page 29 is out of context, is incomplete and actually
supports Appellant's claim that a more detailed description of realty
is necessary.
Therefore, there being no further legal basis cited by Respondent
in opposition to the authority shown by Appellant's brief, (pages 10
and 11), Appellant is satisfied that the foregoing analysis of Respondent's own cases on the subject will support Appellant in this
respect.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT ALLOWED THE SHERIFF'S SALE TO BE CONDUCTED KNOWING
BEFOREHAND THAT PRIOR PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING THE PUBLICATION OF
SUMMONS, USED THE WRONG CASE NUMBER.
Respondent's brief, page 10, second paragraph thereof, admits:
"At some time during March, 1974, Downey (Respondent) discovered that
the ...Clerk had initially assigned the number 4473 to this case and
to a case entitled 'Utah State Employees...etc.' but that upon discovering the error the Clerk had (without informing Downey) added the
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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letter 'A' to the designation of this case (R 1; R 72, p. 5a and 7 ) .
On April 9, 1974, Deputy Sheriff Leon Wilde conducted a sale of the
five parcels of land."
Appellant's brief, page 12, first paragraph thereof, refers to
a specific instance (R 72; par. 7) where an inquiry was misdirected
due to the error admitted to by Respondent herein.

Despite this,

Appellant argues that such an error is implicitly prejudicial when the
same is repeated over and over again on multiple documents in the court
below including most of the pleadings, the Melling affidavit (Respondent's Appendix " A " ) , the Summons (Respondent's Appendix " B " ) , the
California Affidavit of Service (Respondent's Appendix "B", second
sheet), the publication of summons and proof thereof (Respondents
Appendix "E") and the Proof of Publication of the Sheriff's sale itself
(Respondent's Appendix " F " ) , to mention a few.
Appellant's said argument, of implicit prejudice, is particularly
appropriate in the instant circumstances due to what can be considered
a further lack of diligence on the part of Respondent by virtue of
their prior knowledge of such error "during March, 1974" before the
Sheriff's sale on April 9, 1974 (Respondent's brief, page 10).
It seems reasonable that Respondent in an abundance of caution
should have at least re-published the defective summons and Notice of
Sheriff's Sale of Real Property (Respondent's Appendix "F", reverse
side), with the correct numerical designation before permitting the
judicial sale of the subject property where Appellant, appearing as
the last vestee of record in the capacity of "trustee", had on the
face of the record never appeared or otherwise been contacted by
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent.

Moreover, Respondent admits that the nature of Appellant's

trust and the other beneficiaries involved "are as yet unknown to
Respondent" (Respondent's brief, page 9, first paragraph).

Such ad-

mission supports Appellant's argument since "substantial justice"
(Respondent's brief, page 30) certainly fails to serve Appellant where
the aforesaid matters are known to Respondent before said judicial sale,
yet no real diligence is demonstrated in disseminating notice and seeking out the real parties in interest under the subject foreclosure.
POINT V.
RESPONDENT'S INSUFFICIENT, FALSE MELLING AFFIDAVIT AND DEFECTIVE
PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS RELIEVES APPELLANT FROM PRESENTING A "MERITORIOUS
DEFENSE" TO OR RECOGNIZING THE VOID JUDGMENT RESULTING THEREFROM.
Respondent's brief raises two further issues attempting to support
their position, namely:

1) that Appellant did not interpose any

meritorious defense to the original foreclosure, in Appellant's motion
to set aside said proceeding (Respondent's brief, pages 12 to 14); and,
2) that Appellant made no attempt to redeem the foreclosed real property,
after judgment, from the judicial sale buyers (Respondent's brief,
pages 6 and 31).
Germane to the foregoing, Appellant's brief makes these points:
a)

The extended redemption period was for the purpose of per-

mitting Appellant time to obtain and reconcile mortgage payment
records and other matters outside his possession and control, which
he still has been unable to accomplish (Appellant's brief, pages 2, 3,
7, 18 and 19);

-12-
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b)

Appellantwasa non-assuming successor to the original obligors

under the subject mortgages, other parties were obligated to make the
mortgage payments for releases of land,and they retained all records
thereof (which parties were and are now uncooperative and adverse to
Appellant), Respondent and Appellant were not in communication with
each other, Respondent deviated substantially from the terms of the
notes and mortgages involved (moratoriums, changed payment schedules,
altered land release schedules) and Appellant was the ultimate (and
therefore most important) legal title vestee of record.

(Appellant's

brief, pages 2, 3, 7, 18 and 19);
c)

Appellant still has not been furnished with all the Respondent's

relevant records, communications, agreements and other proper evidence
concerning the matters referred to in the preceding paragraphs; nor
have the parties who were in direct contact with and making payments
to Respondent ever furnished a single document to Appellant encompassing such matters, thus entitling Appellant to his legal right of
discovery and trial of the issues.

(Appellant's brief, pages 2, 3, 7,

8, 18 and 19).
Beyond the argument embraced by the foregoing, the fact remains
that the judgment rendered by the court below is void not voidable,
(see POINTS I, II, III, and IV hereof)

This being the case, Appellant

did not have to present a meritorious defense, or submit to the courts
jurisdiction by redeeming the property based on said void decree, as a
condition to setting aside said decree in the said lower court, as
indicated by the following Utah case:

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(2)...Defects In Service. In a suit to set aside a
decree of divorce (quasi in rem action; 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Div. & Sep. Sect. 245) it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to allege that she had a meritorious defense...
or to offer to submit to the jurisdiction of the court
in that action, where the court had never had jurisdiction of her person
(Involves defective service
of summons by publication on non-resident based on
misrepresentation in affidavit)"
(Emphasis and brackets added)
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 Utah 53, 134 p. 595.
"Under such circumstances (defective summons by publication) the respondent was entitled to have the
judgment set aside as a matter of right and not as
a matter of grace, (citing: 1 Black on Judgments

J2d Ed.), Sect7T48)"
(Emphasis and brackets added)
Atkinson v. Atkinson (supra.)
This court did acknowledge the existence of a doctrine which
requires a moving party in an original action to show a meritorious
defense.

However, Utah departs from said principle under the fol-

lowing reasoning:
"But is this the rule without exception, and must a
party also do this in a case wherein the plaintiff
has been guilty of fraud in inducing the court to assume jurisdiction of the action in which the default
judgment is entered, or where, as here, the court
never acquired jurisdiction of the person, because
the order for service by publication and the pretended
summons were void?
the (Utah) state courts can
acquire no_ jurisdiction of the res or subject-matter
so as to render judgment which would be binding."
(Emphasis added)
Atkinson v. Atkinson, (supra; at page 597, first column)
Utah is supported in its adoption of the principle that a party
need not present a meritorious defense, or otherwise submit to
jurisdiction under a void judgment, according to these decisions:
Holcomb v. Creech (Ken. 1933) 56 SW 2d 998 (Action to vacate default
-14-
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judgment for want of proper service of process); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Cooley (Washington) 83 p.2d[ 221 (Cross complaint
to avoid default judgment for invalid service of process); Dixie
Meadows etc. v. Kight (1935 Oregon) 45 p2d 909 (Suit to set aside
judgment for defective service of process); and, here is a more recent case quoted on issues close to Appellant's cause:
"(1) Statute authorizing service of process by publication
must be strictly complied with...";
n

(4) Where affidavit for service by publication was defective, the attempted service by publication was void
and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant." (Emphasis added);
"(5) Tender of meritorious defense is necessary in ordinary proceedings to vacate judgment, but where ground
for vacation of judgment is that court rendering judgment sought to be vacated was without jurisdiction of
defendant by failure to comply with statutory requirements as to service of process (by publication) tender
of meritorious defense is unnecessary."
TTmphasis added!
Beachler et. al. v. Ford (1945 Ohio) 60 NE 2d 330
Even more recent decisions are available, following the foregoing
doctrine, as shown by:
"Meritorious defense is not essential or relevant on
motion to set aside default judgment for lack of jurisdiction by reason of want of service of summons."
Kleinfeldt v. Shoney's of Charlotte (1962 N.C.) 127 SE 2d^ 573.
"Defendant was not required to show meritorious defense
where default judgment which defendant sought to have
set aside was void."
Stafford v. Dickison (1962 Hawaii) 374 P.2^d 665.
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WHEREFORE, Appellant requests this Honorable Supreme Court to
consider the elements of this reply brief together with Appellant's
opening brief in determining the merits of the subject appeal.
DATED this

£***

day of

D f c i o L » ^ 1975.

Respectfully submitted,

DON R. STRONG
Appellant's Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
Joseph L. Krofcheck, upon each counsel for Respondent and the
Intervenors named on the title cover hereof, by mailing the same
to the addresses set forth on said cover, postage prepaid, this
__S

day of

PeAoL*/,

/C

1975.
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